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n old age, after a lifetime with books, with words, I
have taken up the luthier's craft. I have not renounced
words-how could we know anything, including ourselves, without words?-but my words now tend to
rise out of palpable matter, out of wood; my ideas, by
definition airy, rise up from the physical, from muscle
shaping wood into viols. (The viol, by the way, is a bowed
string instrument, possibly ancestor of the modern violin
family. It is often known by its Italian name, viola da
gamba or, illogically, as a gamba. In the 18th century
the viol family-treble, tenor, and bass-was rendered
obsolete by the violin, viola, and cello but has now found
a new life, partly because of renewed interest in early
music, partly because it is so well suited to the amateur
player.)
My work as a luthier I regard as an autumnal calling,
not as a hobby-that trivializing notion-and certainly
not as a way of beguiling the time until the next big
event of my life, the awful one. To build viols is to make
myself useful to musicians, to supply a real need (of
which more later). From a more narrowly personal perspective, it is my way of understanding certain calamities
gathered under the rubric of Progress. Specifically, I
build viols in order to know, even with my bones and
muscles, what it feels like to do skilled, useful, dignified
work in a world intent on degrading all work to the
condition oflabor.
In his book Working, that humane giant Studs Terkel
transcribes the statements of several hundred people
speaking about their jobs. These are people of small
account, not those "whose articulateness and expertise
offered them other forums" but just ordinary working
folk, the people who, driven by necessity, do necessary work and are never heard from, certainly never
consulted: factory workers, janitors, truck drivers, store
clerks, postal workers and such. Being employees-literally, people who are used, or in the unself-conscious
jargon of management, "human resources" -their work
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is generally unfulfilling or worse: dehumanizing, distressing, hazardous. Terkel's first sentence goes right to
the point: "This book, being about work, is, by its very
nature, about violence-to the spirit as well as to the
body."That anodyne abstraction of the economists, the
"disutility of labor," masks the violence that Terkel's
respondents know in their bones and muscles and in
their hearts.
But not all of Terkel's workers lead lives of quiet
desperation, and one of the notable exceptions is Carl
Murray Bates, a stone mason. He is a happy man, fulfilled by his work. Even more exceptionally, he knows,
both intellectually and viscerally, the deepest roots of his
happiness. His work is good, useful, and satisfYing and
he knows exactly those qualities that make it so.
As an experiment, I have asked several of my
friends-broadly educated and thoughtful people"What makes a good job good? What is there in
any occupation that makes it worthy of the worker's
humanity?" It was hard to get any answer to this question because my respondents turned their attention to
the subjectivity of the worker, ignoring the nature of the
work itself. Our exchange might run like this:
"What makes a good job good? Hmm. Well, much
depends on the attitude of the worker. Not everyone
is fitted to do every job. Square pegs in round holes
and all that."
"Yes, true and important. But what is there in the work
itself that lends it dignity or worth?"
"Well, all work has dignity, you know."
"Oh, come on! Is there dignity in driving a truck? Does
the State Torturer do dignified work?"
"I wouldn't want to drive a truck, but a lot of people do
like it. You can't argue with their feelings of fulfillment.
As for the State Torturer, you are confusing the issue
with moral considerations."
"True, I think there must be a moral dimension. But
what is there in truck driving that might lead us to
believe in the trucker's reported fulfillment?"
"Oh, that is arrogant! How like an intellectual to
demand that everyone-a trucker even!-must justify his feelings."

"Isn't there a touch of arrogance in
saying that some people are fitted
by nature to their stultifying work?
Wasn't that just the argument for
slavery?"
"Truckers are not slaves. They may
own their own trucks-they're capitalists, for chris sake!. And they earn
good money."
This dialogue I have assembled
using only bits and pieces salvaged
from several real conversations. Now
Carl Bates would have come right to
the point. He knows why his work is
good. He is a master craftsman and a
free man, and the two are related. At
work, he is the best judge of his virtue.
He knows when he has done well, and
it is his conscience that punishes him
for defects. Wherever he goes, he sees
work he has done, some of it forty
years ago, and he remembers the
particulars of each job. He knows of
defects no one else can even suspect;
and certain felicities in his work constitute his private joy. He is implied in
his work in a pleasurable way, which
is to say that he would never fall into
the delusion that a thing is only what
it is. He knows that a made thing is
compact of all the joy and skill-or all
the misery-of the maker. (We are all
conscious of this in regard to a manifest work of art, hence our interest in
the artist. But we tend to forget that a
beautiful oriental carpet, say, is made
of dead souls, the souls of the enslaved
children who made it. And we repress
our curiosity about them.)
At work, Bates exercises his
body as well as his judgment; he is
a material being shaping matter. He
looks with genial pity upon his sons,
successful bankers and accountants
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bound to their swivel chairs and condemned to handle
nothing more palpable than numbers. Seated before
their computer screens they. re-enact Plato's parable
of the cave, engaging not the world available to the
senses but the icons they worship. Or they prove Wallace Stevens' forthright pronouncement: "Not to live in
a physical world is the greatest poverty." (Apparently,
Bates needs no philosopher or poet to tell him of the
materiality of the world.)
Perhaps most significantly, Bates, through his craft,
is an inheritor. Daily he is connected with the past,
with timeless practices and ends, with experience that
might qualifY as universal. It is reassuring for him that
mortar is still called mud; it was in fact mud when his
Paleolithic forebears walled the entrances to their caves.
The mortar he actually uses is no longer plain mud, yet it
is scarcely superior to that of the Romans, whose stone
and brick works still stand. Nor are Bates' tools and
methods (apart from a powered mortar mixer) much
different. It is still handwork, still one man exercising
skill and judgment in regard to each stone. "Stone is
still stone," says Bates, and "every piece of stone you
pick up is different, the grain's a little different .... It'll
split one way or break the other." And Bates cherishes
a resonant symbolic connection-one might call it a
sacramental connection-with antiquity: "When they
built Solomon's Temple, they started at the northeast
corner," a practice still followed by stone masons. "If
I was gonna build a septic tank, I would start at the
northeast corner."
To the question "What makes a good job good?"
Bates in effect answers thus: good work implies a free
worker, one who exercises his own judgment. Good
work is identified with the worker, expressing his skill
and joy. Good work is physical, sensual, our bodies
engaging the material world as Evolution has prepared
us to do. Good work connects us with timeless human
experience, not in its tragic or heroic aspects but in its
quiet nurturance, its happy service to the necessary;
hence, good work is competence untouched by the spirit
of emulation, that desire to win, to triumph (which of
course is also timeless).
Bates' freedom is not absolute, which is to say that
he is only a craftsman. For absolute freedom one must
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become an artist, as Annie Dillard, in 7he Writing Life,
reminds us: "It is life at its most free ... because you
select your materials, invent your task, and pace yourself"
There is an intimidating price for this freedom: "The
obverse .. .is that your work is ... so worthless to the
world that no one except you cares whether you do it
well, or ever." "No one," she brutally concludes, "needs
your manuscript."
Though Bates is not as free as the artist, neither is
he as isolated. As a craftsman, he is related to others
by need, his own and others'. This mutual dependence
would seem to be one characteristic of good work. E. F.
Schumacher, in Good Work, makes much of mutual need.
Proper work, he says, serves three purposes: "First, to
provide necessary and useful goods and services. Second,
to enable every one of us to use and thereby perfect our
gifts like good stewards.Third, to do so in service to, and
in cooperation with, others, so as to liberate ourselves
from our inborn egocentricity."These conditions, which
derive from Schumacher's religious convictions, seem
unexceptionable- except that "necessary and useful"
constitute a philosophical problem, a bone forever to be
gnawed. However, this wonderful bone that gives and
keeps giving has been buried by economic theory, needs
having been supplanted by wants and desires, especially
as registered by the Market. To be sure, economists have
their reasons. To allow imponderables into the discipline
would compromise its scientific aspiration. Also, orthodox economic theory makes much of freedom, especially
the freedom of the individual to define his own needs
and choose his own ends. And even if one does not hold
freedom to be a high value, it is simply impossible for a
command economy to establish everyone's needs and to
direct resources to the satisfaction of those needs.This
relationship between freedom and the Market in orthodox economics is not clear to me. Does the economist
whisper to the Market, "I could not love thee, dear, so
much, loved I not freedom more"? Or is freedom simply
a happy by-blow of the iron laws of economics? But for
sure, the freedom at issue-as some economists have
noted-is theoretical only, for freedom without power
is meaningless, a joke in dubious taste.
For its own purposes, economics has disposed of
need and usefulness by reducing them to utility, defined
as whatever anyone wants and is able to buy. Yet

55

s6

for every person the philosophical
bone remains. What do I need and
to what end? Questions addressed
more beautifully by Thoreau than by
any orthodox economist. To reject
such grand questions would seem to
violate our human nature, yet such
refusal seems to be the norm: wants
and preferences-"life styles," the
jargon again reductive-are largely
shaped by those vast agglomerations
of power that service those wants and
preferences. Of course, it is not exactly
news that the sciences of manipulation make progress and become ever
more effective both in the Market
and in politics. The point is that the
needs manufactured by corporations
seem unrelated to the promptings of
nature or the counsels of philosophical deliberation.
Work that is needful, as philosophy or nature might specifY, is often
despised. Those who produce food, for
example-farmers, as distinct from
commodities traders-are not much
honored except as businessmen. Also
(as some feminists have lamented)
mothering is too often regarded as
a rather mean occupation, certainly
inferior to executive command (as
other feminists have argued). Teaching too, especially of children in their
most formative years, is generally
treated with condescension. (It is
piquant to observe that Adam Smith,
that great enthusiast of the division of
labor, assigned to educators the task
of humanizing those who have been
dehumanized by their dull repetitive
labors. He could not have anticipated
a university whose main purpose is to
form employees to the specification of
the corporate culture.) Now, it seems,
even doctors are becoming employees,

factors organized by specialists in organization. Perhaps
doctors will join those other authentic need-satisfiers,
the nurses, who have for long performed desperately
needed services without much honor or reward.
Nevertheless, although institutional arrangements
and Market forces undervalue the work of mothers
and teachers and doctors and nurses, these are just the
workers most likely to find their best reward in the
work itsel£ In part, surely, their reward comes from the
confident knowledge that their work is needed-needed
by the people served, by individuals. Every day, they
exercise skill and judgment on a human scale, often in
an intimate relationship with the persons whose needs
are served.
It is far otherwise with most workers, for whom the
idea of need shows itself only in perverse guise. Here is
that usually wise and generous public intellectual,John
Kenneth Galbraith, explaining why we must accept the
perverse:
In all the industrial countries, there is the firm
commitment to the consumer economy-to consumer services-as the primary source of human
satisfaction and enjoyment and as the most visible
measure of social achievement. There is also the
even more urgent need for the income that comes
from production. In the modern economy, a slightly
bizarre fact, production is now more necessary for
the employment it provides than for the goods and
services it supplies.
I have tried to read this little book- The Good Society--as satire. And surely certain remarks show a cutting
irony: ''A vast and energetic advertising industry and the
persuasive power of modern communications, especially
television and radio, are now necessary to instruct the
individual as to his or her desires and thus promote
the resulting consumption." But irony cannot redeem
the literal message. And as satire, it fails as all satire
must fail, given the prevailing sensibility. Satire works
by reminding people, either humorously or savagely,
that they have strayed from their most seriously held
convictions. But the devout faith in consumption as the
"primary source of human satisfaction" offers satire no
purchase. My intent here is not to compare consumption
with the classical measures of achievement-martial
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glory, service to man and God, the creation of deathless
beauty, the quest for wisdom-but rather to oppose the
fun of consumption to the homely dignity of earning
one's bread. Bread, that palpable universal, at once an
earthy particular and a metaphor to be gnawed if we
wish, in Thoreau's words, to "live deliberately."
Of course one must not expect economics texts to
sing of the pleasure and virtue of work, for it is this
discipline, conspiring with the Industrial Revolution,
that has reduced work to labor, a commodity, a factor of
production like land, capital, and rent, hence subject to
the same economic laws. The most famous, and perhaps
the most representative, passage in The Wealth ofNations
is Adam Smith's ecstatic account of how the manufacture of pins can be divided into a series of unskilled
tasks, resulting in a spectacular increase in productivity.
Indeed, it is instructive to read such early economists as
Adam Smith and David Ricardo for their unsentimental
conviction that the production of wealth implies the
destruction of everything human in the producers (and
for Smith, that includes the capitalists). Their attitude
was not diluted by any sense of outrage or regret. Why
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kick against the pricks, in this case the immutable laws
of science? Here is the frigid Ricardo on the promise
of machinery to benefit mankind:
The opinion entertained by the labouring class,
that the employment of machinery is frequently
detrimental to their interests, is not founded on
prejudice and error, but is conformable to the correct principles of political economy.

It is under the conditions created by the "correct
principles of political economy" that the luthier or any
craftsman must search for dignified and intrinsically
rewarding work, work that supplies the needs, both
material and spiritual, of both consumer and producer.
Everything that makes the work worthy of the worker's
humanity, the Economy seeks to "rationalize," meaning
to destroy. Any skill or art-not just the skill of Adam
Smith's pinmaker but that of craftsmen, even of teachers and doctors-is allowed scope only until it can be
reduced to a collection of unskilled motions or supplanted altogether by machinery. This is to say that the
happiness and virtue of the worker counts for less than
nothing in the organization of society. The worker may
seek fulfillment in work, but in an economic perspective work is a cost, something to be "downsized"-the
jargon again full of unwitting self-incrimination. To be
sure, there are still fulfilling jobs in a modern economy,
but they exist only because managerial expertise has not
yet devised a way of eliminating them. A worker should
expect to "re-tool" himself several times over to accommodate himself to the demands of the system. Was man
made for the Sabbath, or the Sabbath made for man?
Was man made for the Economy or the Economy made
for man? It seems that the obvious answer is more of a
boast than a scandal.
The subjective rewards a luthier seeks are pretty
much those of Carl Murray Bates. A luthier wants to
identifY with the work, to put his name on it as an artist
might sign a work. I mean a personal name, the name
of the only begetter of the work-not "Steinway" or
"Yamaha."There is no one in the whole world who can
make a piano, for example. It is an industrial artifact,
the consequence of specialties ranging from metallurgy
and founding to the chemistry of varnish. These specialties are commanded by specialists in commanding,

who could just as expertly command
the making of frozen pizzas or ladies'
underwear.
The name on a viol matters. At
gatherings of viol players, there is
always an exchange ofinquiries: "Who
made your instrument?"There is often
a further question: "This instrument is
patterned on which early craftsman?"
And these questions are more radiant
among viol players than they would be
among violinists, I think. For violins
seem to have evolved into a standard
size and shape and construction
technique while viols are so diverse
in these respects that a casual observer
might consider them to be different
instruments. Professional performers
might choose from among three or
four different bass viols, depending
on the piece of music performed, the
time of its composition, or the effect
intended. But even an amateur player
is intensely aware of the individuality
of his instrument, not just its virtues
and defects but its relationship to
the player. Strings may be long or
short, close together or far apart. The
body may be big or small. (The viol
is held in place by the player's legs,
large viols forcing the legs quite far
apart.) The bridge may be more or less
arched (A pronounced arch allows a
greater margin of error in bowing but
makes wide leaps difficult.) All of this
matters to the player, who is also an
individual, with big or small hands, a
big or small body, short or long legs,
more or less bow control.
And I have not yet mentioned
decoration. Qyite apart from the
music, viols evoke the era in which
they flourished. They were meant to
be looked at and admired. Hence
original instruments have intricate
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patterns of purfling on the front and back, elaborate
carving on the pegbox , carving that culminates in a
carved head at the top or else in a delicate and original
scroll. Fingerboards and tailpieces may have delicate
inlaid filigrees. Even the pegs are elaborate and are
often decorated with ivory studs. None of this is functional-unless we extend the plain sense of the word,
as perhaps early players did. It is clear that Renaissance
and early Baroque musicians regarded the visual as an
intimate complement of the sound. Instruction manuals
of the period suggest even the facial expressions and the
body movements that should support and enhance the
emotional content of the music. And paintings of the
period not only deal lovingly with the instruments but
also show an elegance of dress and coiffure that surely
was meant to make performance a spectacle.
In all these respects, the modern music scene seems
austere. (Rock of course is another story.) Violins and
cellos certainly have their own beauty, especially in
their florid and erotic curves. But everything except
the scroll is functional. Even the purfling-the thin
inlaid line that borders front and back-has a function:
it sets up a glue line that prevents a crack in the fragile
overhanging front from extending into the body of the
instrument. And in any case, the beauty of shape is not
unique but standard. True, scrolls retain their individuality, sometimes identifYing the maker, but this is evident
only to an expert eye and only on close examination.
As for the dress of performers-black, Victorian, and
uniform-it introduces a whiff of repression into the
concert hall. The exception- oh so welcome!-is the
dress of female soloists, reminding us that eye and ear
are parts of the same sensibility.
Of course all this decoration on an instrument comes
at a price-maybe $12000 for a brand new "historically
accurate" reproduction, which may or may not have a
good sound. But even a rather plain instrument is costly
just because it is the work of an individual craftsman
working to the specifications of an individual player. As
yet, the market for viols is not large enough to attract
mass production. (The size of the market may be suggested by the size of the Viola da Gamba Society of
America, which has only about a thousand members.)
And, as noted above, there is no standard model. On the
other hand, cellos, widely used and standardized, can be
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had for as little as $400, with bow and case. That's good
news for parents who want to explore the possibility of
talent in their child, not encouraging news for a luthier
learning his craft.
But the real price cannot be measured in dollars,
nor can we say precisely who pays the price.There is a
disturbing tension at the heart of the matter. We see
this clearly in the experience ofWilliam Morris, a leader
in the resistance to the industrial system of production. Speaking of decoration, he said: "To give people
pleasure in the things they must perforce use, that is
the great office of decoration; to give people pleasure
in the things they must perforce make, that is the other
use of it." So his Kelmscott press produced beautifully
printed and bound books. The only people who could
afford them were the wealthy who, one might reasonably infer, had fattened upon the industrial system.
But even that irony does not get at the critical point,
which is that there is not one class of people specialized as producers and another as consumers. We are all
both-at least ideally. The industrial system pits each
person against himself, like the unemployed shoemaker
wearing Chinese shoes.
Among viol players it is frequently lamented that
the high price of instruments limits the pleasures of the
viol to the moneyed. It is the official aim of the Gamba
Society to get affordable instruments into the hands of
would-be players. In another early music community,
that of recorder players, the problem has been solved
by the Japanese, who make professional quality plastic
recorders for about $50. A hand-made instrument of
comparable quality, one signed by the person who made
it, would cost at least $1000. The plastic instrument is
in effect anonymous; as with the piano, no one in the
world could possibly make one. It is the consequence
not only of industrial organization but of a vast market.
Recorders are the instruments that all Japanese schoolchildren play in school. As in so many analogous cases,
it is a nice question as to whether plastic technology
responded to that market or created it.
There is at least one attempt to call plastic to the
rescue of the viol player: a luthier with entrepreneurial talent now makes treble viols partly of plastic. The
soundboard is wood, a machine-made violin top. I
would guess that the neck, also wood, is carved by a

laser guided milling machine. The
result is an instrument that is cheap,
is presentable enough (the plastic is
painted in "wood grain''), and is fairly
resonant. No doubt the motive behind
this enterprise was to benefit wouldbe viol players of modest means. (An
incidental note: I was asked whether I
would assemble the components, thus
becoming an employee, an anonymous factor of production. Obviously,
Morris' motive, to give people pleasure in the things they make, was not
an entrepreneurial end.)
It should be clear by now that in
large measure my reflections upon
my craft are about the context, the
social environment, in which I live
and work. To be sure, my thoughts
are not always so dismal. I am steadily
dazzled by the work's magical aura. To
teach wood to sing! What romance,
what myth, what tale of witchcraft
or wizardry imposes a task more
demanding of magical potency? It
is no idle flourish to put the case
in such high-flown terms, for this
view is pretty general. Consider the
awe attending the work of Stradivarius and a whole pantheon of
early makers. Mere physicists cannot
explain the tone of the instruments.
Mere chemists cannot duplicate the
varnish. Mere acoustical engineers
cannot determine whether it is the
wood, the varnish, the modeling
and proportions, or simply age that
accounts for tone. Surely, if science
can send a man to the moon .... But
no, the magic persists and is underwritten by a lot of cold cash.
Of course, my thoughts in the
workshop do not continuously
hover in the Empyrean. Much of my
thinking is strictly purposive, a con-
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sideration of ways and means. How to devise a clamp
for the compound curves where sides are glued to neck
block? How to tell whether the rising curves of the belly
are symmetrical? Why does the back, which should be
slightly convex, insist on being concave? And how can
I persuade it otherwise? Being almost altogether selftaught, I have had to devote more mental and emotional
energy to problem solving than does the worker who
inherits the accumulated lore of the craft. Still, even for
me many steps in the process have become established,
ordained. Some familiar procedures have even taken a
tincture of monotony-carving the top, or belly, for
example. In the words of a 16th century English treatise
on viols, the top is "digged from a plank." This means
hours of chiseling, gouging, and scraping to remove
perhaps eighty percent of the plank in the form of
chips, The wood-spruce-is particularly fractious.
The grain lines are hard, but between them the wood
is like marshmallow. The cutting tool wants to slip off
the hard grain and plunge into the punk. Spruce is a
splintery wood and can be cut only in one direction, no
matter where the curves are. And this perverse wood
often won't stand up to the cutting tool; no matter how
sharp the tool, the wood threatens to tear instead of
parting cleanly. However, this obnoxious wood knows
how to sing. And as so often is the case, all vices are
forgiven in deference to one great talent. Still, while
working with this prima donna of woods, one must
deliberate over every stroke of the tool, a condition
that over a period of hours manages to bring together
anxiety and tedium.
Instrument grade spruce is expensive. I buy the
cheapest grade-about a hundred dollars for a piece
suitable for a bass viol top. The price adds somewhat
to the anxiety (I have one piece that cost $270 and so
far I have been afraid to work on it). But there is, in
my view, a more real and more awesome cost, one that
dollars cannot measure. I have counted on a typical piece
of spruce over a hundred growth rings. I owe it to that
tree to produce an instrument that will last at least a
hundred years, and I am not confident I can make good
on this moral debt. Eventually, glue will relax its grip and
wood will crack. When that happens to my instruments,
amoral calculation may determine whether the cost of
repair will exceed the value of the instrument.
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Though my relationship with spruce is strained, with
hard maple I live in harmony. (Neck and body of a viol
are generally, though not always, made of maple.) This
is an accommodating wood to carve or to bend. It is
close grained and uniformly dense, hence can be cut in
any direction. Being very hard, it is capable of minute
definition. For decoration, I carve open scrolls like those
of many period instruments. But perhaps scrolls do not
fully exploit the sculptural potential of maple. Faces
carved in maple-as many early instruments have-can be as detailed as if carved in marble, even to the
hair and eyelids.
To be sure, maple is not as hard as marble-that's just
hyperbole- but in carving it one must really lean into
the cutting tool and it is not hyperbole to affirm that
this physical effort engenders a sense of intimacy. The
wood stands up to, resists, the steel but it is resistance
that amounts to cooperation. It forbids bold strokes
and reproaches any desire for speed. Hence one examines at length the slowly evolving shape, judging and
reconsidering the sweep and grace of the scroll. I do
not pretend that my scrolls show artistic talent-only
that the wood itself has tutored me as best it can and
that I love my teacher.
The cutting tool itself is central to this intimate
making. More and more, I rely on the knife-or rather
on the knives, for I have many, of all shapes and sizes,
some straight, some curved in various arcs, most sharpened along the long edge but some sharpened only at the
rounded tip. Most of my knives I have made myself from
blanks of knife steel. It seems that the knife edge-thin
and beveled on both sides as distinct from a chisel or
gouge edge with its single, rather steep bevel-more
readily finds its way into the tight fibers and lifts off
a thin curl of wood. Chisels and gouges seem to work
like bulldozers, their motor being the mallet. But a knife
edge is thin, tapering gradually into nothing, and this
nothing insinuates itselfbetween the smallest elements
of the wood.
Fanciful? No doubt. Yet luthiers know that the knife
cuts clean. In a survey of seventeen "established luthiers,"
conducted by the Guild of American Luthiers, most
respondents cited the knife as their primary tool. One
luthier says the obvious: ''A sharp knife will cut cleanly
through the cell walls leaving a surface that seems to
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be polished."Indeed! And Dietrich Kessler, an English
luthier, writes that sound holes can be gracefully cut
only with a knife. (I agree, though I confess that when
it comes to sound holes, I finish with a tool that most
luthiers regard with stern reproach: sandpaper.)
While working I think a lot about the eventual
failure of my glue joints. The glue I use is not one of
those wonders of modern chemistry but the old hot
hide glue used by luthiers since the beginning and still.
It is water soluble, hence affected by humidity. There's
a certain advantage in this drawback: those cracks that
are the inevitable destiny of wood will be more easily
repaired because the instrument can be disarticulated.
But I wonder what some future repairman will think
when he or she opens up my instrument and looks at
its secret parts? I have seen the innards of several very
old instruments-and they were crudely done, the
tool marks clearly visible. Apparently the old masters
invested no effort or pride on surfaces that are neither
functional nor visible. A luthier of my acquaintance
remarked that Guarnieri was especially egregious in
this respect. My viols are smoothly finished, inside and
out. Will this future repairman regard this as a measure
of my exacting standards? Or will he find fundamental
faults gilded by a foolish punctilio? (And is it also foolish to worry about any posthumous attention directed
my way?)
As for the tedium-the "disutility of labor"-that
should be examined more closely. The novelist George
Eliot regarded the manual crafts as redemptive, imposing a homely discipline that rescues the worker from
the snares and delusions of the world. (Or, as Schumacher puts it, work serves to "liberate ourselves from
our inborn egocentricity.") So in a poem on Stradivarius, Eliot celebrates that "plain white-aproned man
who stood at work/Patient and accurate full fourscore
years." She touches in passing upon the mystery of
high craftsmanship, that "eloquent silence at the chasm
abrupt/Where knowledge ceases." But she dwells at
length on the monotony of the work. She honors
Stradivarius because
... he never cried
"Why was I born to this monotonous task
Of making violins?" or flung them down
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To suit with hurling act a well-hurled curse
At labour on such perishable stuff.
This wholesome craftsman she contrasts with an
artist who borrows money and drinks while waiting for
inspiration. In this respect, Eliot, herself an artist, takes
her place in a long line of solid citizens-and no small
number of artists as well, beginning with Plato-who
have regarded the artist as a moral and social danger.
In this regard Eliot is thoroughly Victorian, though
not as extreme as her contemporary, Thomas Carlyle,
who cherished the pain, the unhappiness, the heroic
abnegation of work. Especially the sacrifice of self:
for Carlyle the injunction "Know thyself' is a wicked
gospel seducing us with our own egocentricity. Work,
though "never so Mammonish [and] mean," conduces
to spiritual health by turning all energy to the outward
scene, dissolving the self and denying the ego. I suppose
he would approve of Saint Benedict's Rule for Monks,
according to which a Monk who takes pride in his work
is to be removed from it. As for the rewards of work, they
are for Carlyle all implicit in the fact of work. Hence the
man who labelled political economy "the Dismal Science," accepted the Iron Law ofWages, that scientistic
law that holds that wages must suffice to feed the worker
enough to work and procreate but cannot rise above this
because competition will not allow. Carlyle regarded
this not as obscene but as "indispensable." However, he
applied the Iron Law equally to CEO's and dishwashers:
"Money-wages 'to the extent of keeping your worker
alive that he may work more' ... are indispensable alike
to the noblest Worker and to the least noble!"
Carlyle, it seems to me, is a complex, profound, and
self-deluded comforter of those afflicted by the factory
system. He accepts the doctrine of the Fortunate Fall
according to which Adam's curse is a blessing and the
sweat of the brow, though sorrowful and unremitting, is
a gift from the Giver of good things only. There is a nub
of good sense inside of Carlyle's hyperboles; Heaven,
where according to reliable reports the primary industry
is pure contemplation and worship, must be pure Hell.
But I resist Carlyle, partly because his attitude toward
work is but one aspect of an all-embracing spiritual
quest that is beyond my powers of comprehension. Or,
rather, it is not a quest but an absolutely assured vision,

totalitarian in scope and rendered
more frightening by his wonderful
bullying prose style. But I also resist
Carlyle because he lacks the personal
authority to declaim that "All work,
even cotton-spinning, is noble." He
did not work in a cotton mill and did
not give up his humanity to enrich
the mill owner. (Herman Melville
more accurately described the cotton
mill as "The Tartarus of Maids," in
a story of that name.) Only then,
when he is choking on cotton dust,
might he plausibly report that "even
in the meanest sorts of Labour, the
whole soul of a man is composed
into a kind of real harmony." As for
"the pretension to be ... happy," he
dubs it "the whole Atheism." When
he says that "Our highest religion is
named the 'Worship of Sorrow,"' he
means it. His spiritual quest, his fear
of metaphysical despair, leads him
to deny the reality of material desperation. As for wholesome pleasure,
that is altogether beyond his powers
of comprehension.
That prince of economists (and
of course the laughing stock of all
orthodox economists) John Ruskin,
though he experienced even less of
dire labor than Carlyle, knew more
about work and happiness.
Now in order that people may
be happy in their work, these
three things are needed: They
must be fit for it: They must
not do too much of it: and they
must have a sense of success in
it ....
I work about three hours a day in
my viol workshop-but not every day.
That's not only because more would
strain my old body. It is because I need
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to read Carlyle, among other great thinkers. Without
them, my work would lose its color. I need words, ideas,
in order to savor my life-just as Carlyle needed, unbeknownst to himself, an intimate encounter with the
material world to ground his spirituality. Of course
the luthier's work does not demand or even encourage
reflection and expansive thinking. Like any purposive
activity, it is quite mindless, meaning it is focussed on
ways and means and therefore unconcerned with and
uncritical of ends. Yes, reflective engineers happen; the
dam designer may be capable of asking, "Is this dam
necessary? Will it conduce to greater happiness and
virtue?" But we should recognize that such thinking is
heroic. If such questions are genuine, they allow negative
answers and thus threaten something dear and essential
to the questioner. Such thinking is as difficult for a factory worker as for a scientist developing weapons-grade
smallpox virus.
When I suggest to friends that one "must not do
too much" of one's chosen work, I am asked, "Would
you rather have your gall bladder cut out by a workaholic surgeon-an experienced and single-minded
surgeon-or by one who spends afternoons with
poetry?" A shrewd question, and I would like to avoid
a facile answer. Especially, I would not insist on the
moral effects of high art and philosophy, those endeavors that confront us with grand questions. And yet it
remains that the person is at least as important as the
function and that, my gall bladder aside, professional
deformation is a serious affliction. The hero of Kazuo
Ishiguro's novel The Remains of the Day is a butler for
whom competence is not enough; he aspires not just to
work as a butler but to become one (italics in original.)
He says: "A butler ... must be seen to inhabit his role,
utterly and fully: he cannot be seen casting it aside one
moment simply to don it again the next as though it
were nothing more than a pantomime costume." (He
is at this moment reproaching himself for reading a
novel.) No one would deny the pathos of the case in
regard to a butler. Yet some might assert that to become
a surgeon, to "inhabit the role, utterly and fully," is an
exalted destiny or even a saintly apotheosis. Perhaps,
just barely perhaps. However, coming from anyone but a
surgeon or a saint, the assertion is suspect. As for butlers
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or cotton spinners or truck drivers-or luthiers-this
seems a patent absurdity.
It should be obvious by now that as a luthier and as a
person I swim in the sea of time-not in that imaginary
river, that figment, that one cannot step into twice. For
me the past is not gone or irrelevant nor the future utterly
unique. To some degree, I think, this is true of professionalluthiers. From infrequent and casual discussions I
come away strongly impressed by their knowledge of the
past and their sense ofbeing inheritors. Whether they
regard themselves as progenitors-well, I am not sure.
Or, more to the point, I can reflect upon this question
only in a general, non-empirical way.
A craft-engineering or stone masonry, for examples-is not an art and only by a stretch can we examine
it for universals. In this respect it differs from humane
learning. It has always seemed to me that the most vital
duty of a humanities teacher is to engage those who will
never become professionals. Indeed, the expression "professional humanist" seems a contradiction in terms. If
the humanities are for humans, scholarship is for scholars-not the same species-and hence scholars properly
seek to replicate themselves, to engender professionals.
Craftsmen too seek to replicate themselves, and thus
is it understandable that only one professional viol
maker has encouraged this aging amateur. The others
have denied me their advice and instruction, though I
have offered to pay their price. Nothing to complain
about here: I am not the future of their craft.
Yet I myself, with something of a humanist's passion, yearn to pass on what I have learned. Yes, I have
some technical knowledge but also some awareness of
the satisfactions implicit in technique. And though
my technique be as groping as Evolution itself, yet my
instruments are making music, a couple in the hands of
professional musicians and a couple dozen in the hands
of amateurs who but for me would not possess this usually expensive instrument. True, at my level of skill there
is no monetary reward in the craft: but many people do
volunteer work expressly because of the moral content
or the ego-satisfaction of such activity. And many others
in poverty of spirit pursue hobbies, making napkin rings
or wood sheaths for ball-point pens or stained glass
junk. Surely such people demonstrate that there is a
market for non-Market work. There are places of refuge,

and some of them offer work that is
dignified, useful to others, and satisfYing to a healthy ego, at once free and
disciplined, physical or even sensual,
at one with a long past and a hopeful
future. Whatever the professionals
may think, I yearn to open the door
to one such refuge.
I speak of refuge, sanctuary-not
the same thing as home or native
habitat. Refugees cannot sing, as
Robert Frost did:
My object in living is to unite
My avocation and my vocation
As my two eyes make one in sight.
No refuge can redeem the desecration of history-celebrated in
our time as Capitalism, the God that
ended history. But the attempt to join
vocation and avocation, to see with
both eyes, may place the tragedies of
the Market in perspective. That's what
I yearn to teach. Or preach.
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Book Review

Hitler's Bureaucrats: 7he Nazi Security Police and the
Banality ifEvil, by Yaacov Lozowick. New York:
Continuum, 2002; 297 pages, US $29.95.
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erhaps more than any other historical event, the
Holocaust gave new life to the concept of evil. The
atrocities committed by the Nazis against the Jews of
Europe and the other perceived enemies of the racial
state added new dimensions and horror to humanity's
repertoire of murder and human degradation: millions
of innocents killed in the name of the racial state. Yet
one of the most enduring and influential conceptions
of evil that emerged from the study of the Holocaust
stands in stark contrast to the enormity of the event:
Hannah Arendt's (1965) notion of the banality of evil.
When confronted with one of the central actors of the
Holocaust, Arendt saw not the homicidal monster or
psychopath that one might expect, but an everyday
bureaucratic functionary. At his trial in 1961, Adolph
Eichmann looked like an ordinary employee of a large
organization and spoke of mass murder as if it were a
typical industrial and bureaucratic process. The banality
of evil challenges the assumption that the perpetrators
of radical evil must be exceptional-great departures
from normal, civilized behavior-and raises the possibility than even the most common individuals, engaged
in everyday tasks, can be complicit in humanity's worst
crimes.
In his book, Hitler's Bureaucrats: 7he Nazi Security
Police and the Banality ifEvil, Yaacov Lozowick rejects
Arendt's thesis and argues that Eichmann was not at
all banal. He may have appeared banal when on trial in
1961, but in 1941, when he was the right hand man for
Reinhard Heydrich and coordinated the SS genocidal
machine, he was indeed an evil monster determined
to destroy the innocent. Lozowick maintains that a
careful examination of the evidence, some of which
has only come to light in the past decade, shows that
Eichmann and the other dedicated Nazis who orchestrated the Holocaust were in fact exceptional and not
at all like other people. They were radical ideologues
pursuing an anti-Semitic agenda with a passion tempered only by political, legal, and social constraints that
were progressively loosened as Hitler consolidated and
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extended his totalitarian regime. Once these constraints
were removed under the cover of total war, the Nazi
leadership and its core followers moved quickly to realize their goal of a Jew-free Europe.
In a study reminiscent of Raul Hilberg's research
that focuses on the documents generated and circulated by the perpetrators of genocide, Lozowick
bases his conclusions on an extensive examination of
reports and correspondence among Nazi officials in
Germany and occupied France, Holland and Hungary.
The content, origin, routing, and destination of documents both reveal and obscure the roles played by the
political leaders and bureaucrats in the formulation and
implementation of the Holocaust. While direct orders
and "smoking guns" are rarely found, the documents do
reveal a lot about the security police and their attitudes
toward their work and their victims. They consistently
pursued their victims with both vigor and disdain. From
the 1930s onwards, the "desktop murderers" studied by
Lozowick acted within the framework of a unified
bureaucratic police system for all of the Third Reich
that increasingly was able to act without concern for
legal constraints or citizens' rights. Perhaps even more
importantly, they were successful in absorbing more
members into the system and expanding their influence, both horizontally and vertically.
This does not mean, however, that Lozowick places
himself in the camp of those who take an "intentionalist" view of the Holocaust. That is, he does not argue
that Hitler and his followers envisioned the Holocaust
in specific terms well in advance and then carried
out a series of pre-planned steps that led to the gas
chambers and crematoria. Nor is Lozowick advocating "functionalism," the view that the Holocaust was
driven largely by impersonal organizational and policy
dynamics. Instead, he concludes from his careful analysis
of reports and other documents that while the Holocaust resulted from the consistent and hateful intent
to banish all Jews from Germany and then from the
rest of Nazi-controlled Europe, the specific strategies
and tactics used to accomplish a Jew-free Germany and
Europe were identified and implemented in an ongoing
dialogue between the top leadership and operatives in
the field. In other words, the perpetrators' motives were
ideological, but their tactics pragmatic.

Lozowick finds throughout this
process a core of dedicated Nazis that
enthusiastically carried out the most
radical available anti-Jewish policies;
from persecution, to discrimination,
forced emigration, officially sanctioned larceny and pogroms, forced
deportations, ghettoization, and
finally mass murder. The documents
show that, rather than operating from
a grand scheme or plan, leaders and
followers sought out, debated, and
experimented with new approaches
to the "Jewish problem" and the goal
of achieving a racially pure nation in
response to evolving circumstances,
problems, and opportunities. It wasn't
necessary to envision mass murder in
the 1930s to be able to make it official
policy in the 1940s. What was necessary was the consistent presence and
determined efforts of Eichmann and
his accomplices.
Lozowick does not see Eichmann
and other Nazi leaders as representative of ordinary Germans as in
Goldhagen's (1996) assertion of a
culturally based "eliminationist" antiSemitism. Nor are they representative
of "ordinary men" as in Christopher
Browning's (1992) explanation of
perpetrator behavior as conditioned
by more universal social and organizational dynamics. Instead, he found
that "The more I came to know these
bureaucrats the less familiar they
became" (7).1hese "desktop murderers" were all young, male, Christian,
and nationalist minded Germans
who had voluntarily joined the Nazi
party and the SS long before it was
fashionable or convenient to do so.
In contrast to Arendt, who concluded
that Eichmann " ... never realized
what he was doing," Lozowick argues
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that Eichmann and his accomplices were" ... a group of
people completely aware of what they were doing, with
high ideological motivation, of high initiative and dexterity. (8)"1hey hated Jews and thought that getting rid
of them would be good for Germany. They understood
that their anti-Semitic actions were unacceptable except
within the racist value system of the Third Reich. They
were motivated evildoers, not banal functionaries.
In another recent study, Michael Mann (2000)
shows that the Holocaust was indeed perpetrated by
a core population of dedicated Nazis, but not only by
them.
These "real Nazis" operated amid a much broader
range of perpetrators, many of whom were likely to be
rather more
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ordinary ... Among the lower administrators
in the transport and other agencies smoothing
the flow of victims, we would doubtless find
many Germans with virtually no prior history of
Nazism or violence, exhibiting the whole range of
prejudices, equivocations, and moral evasions that
studies have suggested characterized the German
population as a whole. Germans turned a blind eye,
thought about matters of more personal concern,
cared nothing for disliked Jews, and facilitated
the trajectory of the victims, with practiced and
entirely normal human moral weakness. (Mann,
2000: 357)
A key question, therefore, is: How did this much
larger population of ordinary Germans come to be
involved in the Holocaust? Lozowick rejects the "slippery slope" metaphor and argues that the hard core
Nazis pulled others into their realm of anti-Semitism
rather like expert alpinists helping others to climb to
new heights of evil (278). While Eichmann and his
associates climbed higher than others-and continued
killing Jews right up to the end of the war-they nevertheless led many others to heights of evildoing that they
would not have accomplished otherwise. This metaphor
suggests that the evil of the Nazis was both seductive
and powerful, masked not by banality but by visions of
grandeur and superiority. As Lozowick puts it, "The
word evil fits them in its full awesome sense" (275).
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In effect, Lozowick ends up advocating the "satanic
greatness" thesis that Arendt found so objectionable.
Arendt rejected the notion that there was any dimension of greatness, accomplishment or achievement in
the act of genocide. For Arendt, evil lacks depth and
is characterized by the inability to make independent
judgments and to think from or appreciate the other's
point of view.
It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never
"radical," that it is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimensions.
It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world
because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is
"thought defYing," ... because thought tries to reach
some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment
it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because
there is nothing. That is its "banality" (quoted in
Bernstein, 2002:218).
Even Lozowick points out that while Eichmann
and his colleagues in the SS studied Jewry intensively
during the 1930s, in the end "They understood nothing" (37). 1 While he may have been cunning, ambitious,
and intelligent, Eichmann limited the application ofhis
skills to the surface level of understanding, studiously
avoiding the depths of human experience and feeling:
" ... it was not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic
inability to think" (Arendt, 1971:417). Indeed, this is what
was necessary for the sustained effort of mass murder
that came to define the Holocaust. Eichmann's actions,
and those of the Nazis in general, are not the result of
reaching some great heights of evil, but rather reflect
their total moral collapse, a nearly complete failure to
recognize or understand the full and tragic implications
of their actions.
While his study provides considerable insight into
the workings of the Nazi police bureaucracy, Lozowick
ultimately fails to make his case against the banality of
evil, mainly because he doesn't appreciate or examine the
full spectrum of Arendt's thought on evil and the Holocaust. Overlooked by Lozowick and central to Arendt's
understanding of evil is the concept of"superfluousness."
By making their victims superfluous, the Nazis were able
to legitimize, pursue and sustain a prolonged campaign
of mass murder while masking its moral implications.

The concentration and death camps
became the final stage in the process
of "making human beings as human
beings superfluous," of destroying
any vestige of human individuality
and spontaneity (Bernstein, 2002:
210-211). The Nazis not only killed
their victims, they first rendered them
stateless, then homeless, and, for
those who died in the camps, utterly
without the most basic necessities of
human dignity and existence. 2
The banality of evil was symptomatic of this process whereby the
perpetrators destroyed and then
disposed of their victims as objects
in a manner that closely resembled
"normal" administrative procedures
(Adams and Balfour, 1998).1his was
not the only method of mass murder
in the Holocaust, but it was the
method that sets it apart from other
such events and challenges our faith
in modern political/administrative
institutions and processes. Administrative evil is masked, in part, because
it occurs at the heart of modern civilization, perpetrated by the guardians
of the nation state. When confronted
with the facts of the Holocaust we are
forced to come to the conclusion that
Auschwitz and the other concentration and death camps signal that
human "progress" and the advance
of civilization produced new forms
of evil (Rubenstein, 1975).
The types of evil that Lozowick
lists in his final chapter-indifference, selfishness, heartlessness, and
malevolence-can certainly be found
in perpetrator behavior in the Holocaust and throughout human history.
These are all motivations that can be
associated with criminal behavior. But
the Holocaust is not a matter of the
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commission of mere crimes. Crimes
are already defined by an existing
legal order and can be identified and
punished. But as Richard Rubenstein
(1975:87) pointed out, "One of the
most difficult conclusions to which
we have come ... is that the Nazis
committed no crime at Auschwitz
since no law or political order protected those who were condemned to
statelessness and then to the camps."
No crime was committed because, for
the perpetrators (and even bystanders), the victims were not regarded as
people. And, most of the perpetrators
were never brought to justice?
The banality of evil refers to
perpetrating evil while operating at
a surface level of consciousness and
morality, failing to recognize and
admit to the full implications .-:>f
one's actions. Seeing Eichmann as
banal does not mean accepting his
defense of just following orders or
being a mere cog in a larger system.
Eichmann and his colleagues believed
in an ideology but never scratched
below its surface to consider its
true validity and implications. They
served the ideology, but also used it
to their own benefit. They acted not
as demons, but as bureaucrats seeking
the security of a steady job. Lozowick's
analysis shows how Eichmann and
others made themselves indispensable to their leaders at the expense
of the Jews. Ultimately, they too had
to be very much aware of their own
potential to become superfluous. Most
joined the Nazi party at a time when
they felt cast off by society and found
a sense of belonging among other
marginalized and like-minded men.
They later became part ofbureaucratic
organizations in a totalitarian regime

where the individual is subordinate to the position and
the needs of the regime and can be eliminated at any
time. They helped to institutionalize mass murder and
dehumanization, making it routine and banal, and providing "important" positions and careers for the Nazi
faithful. Plans were in place to continue this process well
beyond eliminating the Jews by extending the society
of total domination to millions of conquered Slavs in
Poland and Russia, giving permanence to the society
of total domination that was "perfected" in Auschwitz.
Eichmann and others like him would never become
superfluous as long as there was a massive population
of "surplus people" to be enslaved and dehumanized
(Rubenstein, 1975).
Conventional conceptions of evil or wrongdoing
were unable to comprehend or explain the Holocaust,
which tempts us to view it in terms of some sort of
satanic greatness. This is the problem that Arendt
wrestled with, which the banality of evil helps to
explain but also leaves us wondering what can be done
about it, since the same procedures that created and
ran the concentration and death camps are part and
parcel of every modern organization. Eichmann was
both exceptional and banal. Exceptional in that he was
at the center of the circle of perpetrators, and banal in
that he wore the mask of administrative evil, embodying
the persona of the desk murderer that so many others
could comfortably adopt. What frustrates Lozowick
and all who would seek justice for the victims is that the
motives of the perpetrators were murky, superficial, and
uninspiring. There is no greatness, only waste and loss.
They did not reach dizzying heights.They only set the
bar low enough so that many could pretend that they
did so at the expense of the innocent.

Notes
1. Consider the similarities between Eichmann's mentality and what has been termed as Hitler's 'pigeon-hole'
mind. He read voraciously but for confirmation of already
existing biases and beliefs with an inability to subject his
or others ideas to systematic or logical critique. The Nazi
ideology can be seen as an outgrowth of Hitler's and his
followers' desire to eliminate all difference and ambiguity,
to institutionalize shallowness and uniformity (see, for
example, Kershaw, 1998).
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2. See also Rubenstein (1975) and the concept of"surplus
populations."
3.1he situation is somewhat different today thanks to the
efforts of Raphael Lemkin and others to define the crime
of genocide and to create international law and the means
of enforcing it (see, for example, Powers, 2002) .
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